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13 July 1964

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file mission folder
C184C

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : SAM Sites in China; [] Reconnaissance Procedures

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1. This memorandum is in response to your questions on the above subjects addressed to the DD/I on 9 July 1964.

SAM SITES

2. There has been no evidence from any source that SAM sites or SAM-associated equipment exist at or near Lungchi airfield, the area where the [] U-2 (mission C184C) was lost on 7 July 1964. To date, a total of 16 missile sites have been identified in China -- all by photography -- and only one of these, located at Sian in central China, is known to have all the equipment necessary for firing a missile. None of the 16 are located in the Lungchi area.

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3. Latest [] photography in the Lungchi area was taken on [] [] (the day of the U-2 loss) and on []. The [] flight missed the Lungchi area by approximately 25 miles. Two missions, however, were flown on [] in direct response to our needs for information on the U-2 loss. Nothing significant was noted on these missions although the area was 80% cloud covered. The last useable U-2 photography of this area was acquired on [] [] and the latest interpretable KII photography (KII-4) was acquired []. No indications of SAM sites with the normal identifying [] features were noted in any of this photography.

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4. Peiping attaches a high priority to its air defense, particularly in the coastal areas where penetrations by [] aircraft are frequent. It is logical to assume that if Peiping has a capability to produce these missiles, or had received them in quantity, there would be a far greater number of deployed, fully operational sites, particularly along the coast where penetrations are frequent. There has been no such deployment.

~~Therefore, we believe it is highly unlikely that a SAM site would be located in the area of the recent loss. It is not an area of frequent penetrations nor is it an area which would logically be on a high priority list for defense by SAMs.~~

[] PROCEDURES

5. [] missions, targets and flight tracks are planned [] and are submitted via CINCPAC to JCS who includes them in the JRC Monthly Forecast of Air Activities for consideration and approval by the 303 Committee. The flights originate from and are recovered on [] The film is processed on [] and is read-out [] US military photo interpreters at the [] An Immediate Photo Interpretation Report is prepared and issued by cable to the intelligence community. A copy of the film is forwarded to the [] [] where additional analysis and reporting is performed as required. Any immediate specific requests for photography, which may originate within the community as a result of the cabled reports, may be made to either []

6. NPIC receives dupe positives of [] photography about 15 days after the missions are flown. These are screened to determine if there are any changes or additions to the field read-out; and if something of significance

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Is found, a cable is sent to the community. Whenever COMOR targets are covered and changes are noted, a PI brief is issued by NPIC. The latest [] photography studies by NPIC on the area where the U-2 was lost was from the mission flown on []

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7. There is a standing requirement on NPIC to report the location of any new SAM, or suspected SAM sites in China. OSI and OCI routinely evaluate and report on any information pertaining to SAM sites in Communist China. A concentrated re-examination of all photography was made following the U-2 loss.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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